

















It is common amonst macroeconomists to view aggregate investment ﬂuctuations as a
rational response to ﬂuctuating incentives, driven by exogenous movements in total factor
productivity. However, this approach raises a number of questions. Why treat investments
in physical capital as endogenous, while treating those in intangible capital as exogenous?
Relatedly, why would productivity changes exhibit such strong co—movement across diverse
sectors of the economy, and why are the short—run, empirical relationships between aggregate
investment and measures of investment incentives, such as Tobin’s Q, so weak? We address
these and other related issues using a model of “implementation cycles” that incorporates
physical capital. In doing so, we demonstrate the crucial role played by endogenous innovation
and incomplete contracting, inherent to the process of creative destruction.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Fluctuations in the aggregate investment rate are a central feature of the business cycle. As
Figure 1 illustrates, the rate of U.S. investment in ﬁxed, non—residential assets displays regular,
and recurring patterns of activity over time.1 According to Keynes (1936), investment ﬂuctua-
tions played a central causal role in driving business cycles. He argued that the co—movement
of investment across diverse sectors of the economy was exogenously driven by a kind of mass
psychology which he termed “animal spirits”.2 More recently, economists have attempted to un-
derstand movements in aggregate investment as an optimal response to measurable incentives. In
the canonical Real Business Cycle (RBC) model, for example, ﬂuctuations in aggregate invest-
ment are driven by exogenous ﬂuctuations in total factor productivity (TFP) that change the
incentives to produce investment goods relative to consumption goods. However, this increasingly
standard approach raises a number of conceptual and quantitative questions.
First, why treat investment in tangible, physical capital as an endogenous response to in-
centives, while implicitly treating shifts in the production function as exogenous? Many of these
shifts result from costly investments in intangible capital, which seem just as likely to respond en-
dogenously to incentives. For example, re—organization of ﬁrms may require a costly re—allocation
of managerial eﬀort that will only take place if the anticipated returns are suﬃciently high. Over
the past 15 years there have been considerable advances in understanding the potential and actual
role of endogenous innovation on long run growth, but this has had relatively little inﬂuence on
business cycle research.3
Second, why do these apparent shifts in TFP take place in such a clustered fashion across
diverse sectors of the economy? Assuming from the outset that TFP movements aﬀect all sectors
symmetrically seems no better on a conceptual level than directly assuming that investment co—
moves across sectors because of animal spirits.4 One possibility is that these shifts are the result
of general purpose technologies (GPTs) which aﬀect all sectors. However, there is little evidence
supporting this idea at business cycle frequencies.5 As Lucas (1981) reasons, while productivity
1The investment rate fell during all post—war, NBER—dated recessions (the shaded regions in Figure 1) and
typically rose during expansions. The only exceptions were around 1967 and 1987, which saw large declines in
investment but aggregate slowdowns that were not dated as NBER recessions.
2One modern incarnation of this idea is to model animal spirits as purely exogenous, but self—fulﬁlling changes
in expectations (see e.g. Farmer and Guo 1994). In this case, investment is optimal but the aggregate incentives
are stochastically driven by “sunspots”.
3One clue to the potential importance of viewing technology shifts as, at least partially, endogenous comes from
the work of Hall (1988) who ﬁnds that the Solow residual is signiﬁcantly correlated with factors that do not seem
likely to have a direct impact on technology.
4The RBC literature generally takes this clustering of productivity improvements as given, and focuses on the
propagation mechanism.
5We discuss this literature in more detail in the following section.
1shocks may be important at the ﬁrm level, it is not immediately obvious why they would be
important for economy—wide aggregate output ﬂuctuations.
Thirdly, if investment really is optimally determined, why is the short—term empirical rela-
tionship between aggregate investment and contemporaneous measures of investment incentives
apparently so weak? In particular, while there is some evidence of a long run relationship, nei-
ther micro nor macro level empirical work has generally found a signiﬁcant short—run relationship
between investment and Tobin’s Q – the ratio of the equity value of ﬁrms, to the book value of
the capital stock.6 As is well known, one cannot infer from this that investment is sub—optimal
because Tobin’s Q need not reﬂect the marginal incentives to invest,7 and because equity values
are likely to include the values of intangible, as well as tangible, capital.8 But then the ques-
t i o na r i s e sa st ow h a tk i n do fr e l a t i o n s h i pw es h o u l de x p e c tt oo b s e r v eb e t w e e ni n v e s t m e n ta n d
measurable proxies of ﬁnancial incentives over the business cycle.
Figure 1 is suggestive of some kind of relationship. Figure 1(a) shows the investment rate
and Tobin’s Q for the US between 1953 and 2003. Figure 1(b) shows the rate of change in
the four—quarter moving average of each time series.9 In general there appears to be a lead—lag
relationship, with the investment rate most highly correlated with the value of Tobin’s Q three to
four quarters earlier. It is this observation that has led some investigators to specify an exogenous
“time—to—plan” period in their quantitative analyses (see Section 2). However, the relationship
is more complex than this. In particular, Tobin’s Q appears to lead investment especially during
the latter part of expansions and recessions, with Q falling several quarters before investment
declines and rising several quarters prior to expansions.10 During the early phases of expansions
and recessions the two series exhibit a contemporaneous correlation.
A ﬁnal conceptual issue is whether it is reasonable to view investment declines, and hence
recessions, as being driven by bad technology outcomes? The recent RBC literature has demon-
strated that, in the presence of capital and labor market rigidities, it is not necessary to have
negative shocks to TFP in order to generate downturns in output (see King and Rebelo, 2000).
However, the traditional Keynesian view that recessions largely result from sharp declines in ag-
gregate investment demand, driving production below capacity, seems consistent with the beliefs
of policy—makers and many in the private sector. The implications of such views seem worthwhile
to at least explore in a formal framework.
6First suggested by Tobin (1968) and Brainard and Tobin (1969). See Cabellero, 1999 for a recent survey.
7As shown by Abel (1979) and Hayahsi (1982), when there are adjustment costs, marginal and average Q need
not be equal.
8See Hall (2001b).
9Similar ﬁgures appear in Cabellero (1999).
10There are a number of rationalizations of this behavior in the literature. We discuss these in the next section.
































































































































































































































































































































QIn this article, we take the view that in order to understand the relationships between aggre-
gate investment, productivity and the stockmarket over the business cycle, one must deal head-on
with the source and timing of productivity ﬂuctuations, the reasons for sectoral co—movement, and
the apparent delay in investment in response to incentives. Our starting point for thinking about
these issues is Shleifer’s (1986) model of “implementation cycles”. He shows that in the presence
of imperfect competition, the implementation of a productivity improvement by one ﬁrm may
increase the demand for anothers’ products by raising aggregate demand. This induces innova-
tors, who anticipate short-lived proﬁts due to imitation, to delay the implementation of their own
innovation until others implement, thereby generating self—enforcing booms in aggregate activity.
Though capable of generating both co—movement and delay in implementation, Shleifer’s model
cannot, however, serve as a framework for understanding investment cycles. This is because the
sectoral co—movement that he establishes is not robust to the introduction of capital or, in fact,
any storable commodity. Anticipating a boom, producers would produce early when wages are
low, store the output, and sell in the boom when prices are high, thus undermining the cycle.11
Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) show how a similar process of endogenous clustering can arise
due to the process of “creative destruction” familiar from Schumpeterian endogenous growth
models. Like imitation, potential obsolescence limits incumbency and provides incentives to
cluster implementation. However, in their framework, where productive resources are needed to
generate new innovations, allowing for the possibility of storage does not rule out clustering, and
in fact yields a unique cyclical equilibrium.12 Moreover, because this costly innovation tends to
be bunched just before a boom, it causes a downturn in aggregate output (even if the measure of
GDP includes this investment).13 Because of its ability to accommodate storage, this framework
is more promising as a vehicle for understanding investment. However, the addition of physical
capital which is completely ﬂexible after being installed still undermines their cyclical equilibrium.
Full ﬂexibility of installed physical capital is, however, at odds with recent evidence on invest-
ment behavior. In particular, there is considerable direct evidence that many types of physical
investment are not reversible and feature inﬂexible characteristics once installed (see Ramey and
Shapiro, 2001, Kasahara, 2002). Doms and Dunne (1993) also document the considerable “lumpi-
ness” of plant level investments, while Cabellero and Engel (1998) demonstrate the high skewness
11Shleifer’s model is also subject to a number of other criticisms including the fact that there are no downturns
and that there is a continuum of multiple cyclical equilibria, making the predictions of the model rather imprecise.
Moreover, while the timing of implementation booms is endogenous, the innovations themselves arise exogenously.
12Shleifer (1986) assumes that innovations arise exogenously. When innovation is endogenous, growth is inti-
mately related to the business cycle.
13Our interpretation of innovation is not R&D, but rather labour—intensive activities such as re—organization or
the development of new ideas. While capital—intensive R&D is often found to be mildly procyclical, Francois and
Lloyd—Ellis (2003), discuss evidence that other kinds of innovative activities are counter—cyclical.
5a n dk u r t o s i so b s e r v e di na g g r e g a t ei n v e s t m e n td a t a . 14 Moreover, the variation in “shiftwork”
over the business cycle (see Bresnahan and Ramey 1994, Hammermesh 1989 and Mayshar and
Solon, 1993) is consistent with some degree of inﬂexibility in factor proportions, since it implies
that capital is being used less intensively during recessions than is optimal ex ante.
Here we introduce physical capital into the framework developed by Francois and Lloyd-Ellis
(2003) in order to understand the business—cycle relationships between investment, productivity
and the stockmarket.15 We model production in a way which captures, as simply as possible, the
inﬂexibility of installed capital relative to uninstalled capital. Speciﬁcally, we assume that, once
installed, capital becomes irreversible, lumpy and sector—speciﬁc. Moreover, we assume that while
the ratio of utilized capital to labor hours can be increased as output expands and more capital
is added, it cannot be adjusted as output contracts and no new capital is being added.16 Instead
we assume that capital utilization is variable, so that contractions are associated with under—
utilization. Our assumptions are similar in eﬀect to the assumption of “putty—clay” production
technology.17
Along the equilibrium growth path that we study, expansions are triggered by the imple-
mentation of accumulated productivity improvements. These improvements arrive stochastically
across sectors during the recession, gradually increasing ﬁrm values, so that Tobin’s Q starts to
rise prior to the boom. However, since ﬁrms optimally choose to delay implementation, invest-
ment lags behind the increase in Q. During the expansion, capital is accumulated continuously
and smoothly. At its end, the economy enters a recessionary phase where capital ceases to be
accumulated. As demand falls, the fact that the ratio of utilized capital to labor hours is ﬁxed
implies that producers continuously reduce capital utilization throughout the recession. This
anticipated decline in demand causes Tobin’s Q to fall during the preceding investment boom –
thus Q leads investment into the recession too.
Although our focus here is on the nature of investment cycles, our results are delivered in a
framework where the economy’s aggregate ﬂuctuations arise endogenously. There are no simple
14A related literature emphasizes the role of plant level investment irreversibilities. However, recent work (see
Veracierto, 2002 and Thomas 2002,) in the RBC tradition has found that the eﬀects of such irreversibilities at the
aggregate level are virtually non—existent.
15Using the simpler model of Shleifer (1986) as a vehicle for this analysis will not work, even with inﬂexible
capital. Storage of any kind undermines the clustering of activity there. The endogenous innovation, present in
Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003), is a necessary part of the equilibrium.
16To ﬁx ideas, consider the example of a car manufacturer. As the demand for cars expands, it can add new
equipment to a given workforce working at maximum capacity, thereby raising the capital—labour ratio and in-
creasing labour productivity. However, as output contracts the manufacturer retains the installed capital (due to
irreversibility), but uses it less intensively and reduces the number of shifts in proportion, so that the ratio of
utilized capital to labour hours remains ﬁxed. The lumpiness assumption implies that the manufacturer cannot
rent out the capital to another car manfacturer during breaks between shifts.
17We discuss the relationship to that literature in Section 2.
6causal relationships between the variables of interest studied here, instead all of these are general
equilibrium implications arising from the growth process. Expansions are “neoclassical”, supply—
side phenomena which directly raise both potential output, through the delayed implementation of
productivity improvements, and actual output through increased production labor, re—utilization
of installed capital and subsequent capital accumulation. Recessions are “Keynesian” demand—
side contractions during which actual output falls below its potential, investment slows, and
some capital resources are left under—utilized. These reductions in aggregate demand are an
equilibrium response to the anticipated future expansion, as eﬀort shifts into long—run growth
promoting activities, and out of current production.18
A key feature of our model is that the owners of physical capital and the owners of intangible
capital are distinct entities (e.g. banks and entrepreneurs). In our baseline model, we allow
capitalists to oﬀer a sequence of future prices per unit of utilized capital that they can commit to
ex ante. During expansions, threat of entry from replacement capitalists induces the incumbent
capitalist to oﬀer a capital price sequence whose present value is just suﬃcient to cover the cost
of the capital. However, during downturns, the competition faced by incumbent capitalists is
diminished and, if they could, they would raise their price above the competitive level that they
had originally oﬀered. By assuming that incumbent capitalist are committed to prices oﬀered
before the downturn occurs, we eﬀectively rule out such opportunistic behavior. In an extended
version of the model (Section 9) we show that the same outcomes can be supported through
endogenous, incomplete contracts.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the relationship between this paper and
others in the literature. Section 3 sets up the basic model and Section 4 posits and describes the
cyclical growth path. Section 5 develops the implications for the movement of key aggregates and
prices through the posited cycle. Section 6 sets up the key existence conditions and Section 7
characterizes the stationary cyclical growth path. Section 8 explores the main implications of the
cycle and Section 9 shows that our results are robust to allowing a greater range of contracting
possibilities. Section 10 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Relationship to the Previous Literature
A standard way to think about the relationship between investment and Tobin’s Q (common in
the RBC literature) is to abstract from issues regarding intangibles, but to assume that capital is
subject to quadratic costs of adjustment. The prediction of such a model is that investment should
exhibit a positive contemporaneous relationship with Tobin’s Q. Adding additional constraints
18Here we are assuming that all labour is skilled and is mobile across sectors. As we discuss in our conclusion,
introducing unskilled labour with putty—clay production would also result in unemployment during recesions.
7such as a “time to build” assumption helps to smooth out the response of investment to measured
incentives, but this alone cannot capture the observed delay of 3 to 4 quarters. In order to capture
the lead—lag relationship discussed above, Christiano and Todd (1996), Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano and Vigfusson (2001) also introduce a notion of “time to plan” –
a ﬁxed time period between the date when the decision to invest more (less) is made and the date
when the actual funds are allocated. Although this “does the job” in some sense, the assumption
is somewhat ad hoc. Our approach oﬀers an alternative rationalization that endogenizes the delay
as a result of strategic timing decisions.
A second common approach to thinking about the relationship between Tobin’s Q and in-
vestment emphasizes the role of intangibles in aﬀecting the economy—wide value of ﬁrms. Hall
(2001b), Hobijn and Jovanovic(2001) and Laitner and Stolyarov (2003), for example, all empha-
size the long run implications of the IT revolution, the anticipation of which is dated to the early
1970’s. The idea is that the stock market moved immediately with the arrival of the informa-
tion, but investment was delayed until the 1990s. Laitner and Stolyarov (2003) emphasize the
capital and knowledge obsolescence caused by the arrival of such a general purpose technology
(GPT). However, while their framework is applicable to long—term cycles, there is little evidence
supporting the arrival of GPTs at business cycle frequencies (see Jovanovic and Lach, 1998, and
Andolfatto and Macdonald, 1998).19
Our model incorporates the role of both knowledge capital and adjustment costs in determining
the relationship between investment and Tobin’s Q over the business cycle. With endogenous in-
novation, of course, a component of ﬁrm values must reﬂect the returns to intangible investments.
In addition, our assumptions regarding capital can be viewed as reﬂecting a form of asymmetric
adjustment costs (see also Cabellero, 1999). When expanding, capital adjustment is unimpeded
but, once installed, capital is prohibitively costly to adjust and cannot be converted into a con-
sumption good, nor into another capital good with diﬀerent capital-labor intensity. In fact, our
assumptions regarding the ex post inﬂexibility of capital are similar to those of the “putty-clay”
model (Johansen, 1959), except that here capital is not vintage—speciﬁc and is inﬁnitely lived.20
As in the putty-clay model, however, the irreversibility we assume implies a tight connection be-
tween changes in demand and changes in employment and capacity utilization. Our assumption
that investments are lumpy, in that they cannot be partly dismantled and used elsewhere is also
consistent with micro evidence (see Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power, 1999).
Most previous work on endogenous cycles and growth has been restricted to single sector
19Indeed, Laitner and Stolyarov (2003) cite evidence suggesting there have only been seven major technological
innovations of this kind identiﬁed in the last 200 years.
20Fuss (1977) and Gilchrist and Williams (2000) present evidence supporting a putty-clay view of capital.
8settings.21 These works cannot be translated readily into a multi-sector setting because they
include no force generating co-movement. One exception is the model developed by Matsuyama
(1999, 2001)22 who, like Shleifer (1986), emphasizes the role of short—lived monopoly power due
to exogenous imitation. The cycles that arise in his model do not depend on delay to generate
cyclical behavior, and are thus robust to capital accumulation through the cycle. However,
Matsuyama’s framework is more suited to understanding longer—term movements in the nature
of growth, rather than business cycle ﬂuctuations.23 In particular, there is no phase of his cycle
that could be called a recession: production and consumption never decline, and capital is always
fully utilized.24















Figure 1: Structure of the Economy
The structure of the economy is illustrated in Figure 1. There is no aggregate uncertainty.
Time is continuous and indexed by t ≥ 0. The economy is closed and there is no government
21Jovanovic and Rob (1990), Cheng and Dinopolous (1992), Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998), Li (2000), Aghion
and Howitt (1998), Evans, Honkephoja and Romer (1998) and Walde (2001).
22Another exception is Francois and Shi (1999), but that model inherits the lack of robustness to storage in
Shleifer (1986).
23Indeed, Matsuyama is careful to apply his model to longer term issues such as the US productivty slowdown.
24Morover the innovative process is capital intensive, suggesting R&D plays a central role.







where ρ denotes the rate of time preference and σ represents the inverse of the elasticity of







where w(t) denotes wage income, S(t) denotes the household’s stock of assets (ﬁrm shares and
capital) at time t and R(t) denotes the discount factor from time zero to t. The population is
normalized to unity and each household is endowed with one unit of labor hours, which it supplies
inelastically.
Final output can be used for the production of consumption, C(t), investment, ˙ K(t),o rc a n
be stored at an arbitrarily small ﬂow cost of ν > 0 per unit time. It is produced by competitive
ﬁrms according to a Cobb—Douglas production function utilizing a continuum of intermediates,
xi, indexed by i ∈ [0,1]:






For simplicity we also assume that there is no physical depreciation. Intermediates are completely
used up in production, but can be produced and stored for later use. Incumbent intermediate
producers must therefore decide whether to sell now, or store and sell later at the ﬂow storage
cost ν.
Output of intermediate i depends upon the state of technology in sector i, Ai (t), the stock
of installed capital, Ki(t), the variable rate at which that capital is utilized, λi(t) ≤ 1,a n dl a b o r












if xi(t) <x i(z).
(4)
Here
z =a r gm a x
s<t
{xi(s)} (5)
is the date at which the last increment to capital was installed and {Ki(z),L i(z)} is the capital—
labor combination chosen at that date. Labor hours are perfectly mobile across sectors but,
installed capital, Ki(t),i ss e c t o r — s p e c i ﬁc, irreversible and non-divisible, so that any part of it
that is not utilized cannot be used elsewhere (i.e. ˙ Ki ≥ 0). We denote the level of utilized capital
by Ku
i (t)=λ(t)Ki(t).
10An implication of this structure is that during an expansion, when new capital is being built, a
ﬁrm’s ability to substitute between capital and labour is represented by Cobb—Douglas production
isoquants (curved in Figure 2). However during a contraction, when the ﬁrm produces below
capacity, its production possibilities are represented by Leontief production isoquants whose kink
points lie along a ray from the origin to the chosen point on the full-capacity isoquant. In such
a situation, the installed capital will optimally be used less intensively in proportion to the labor







Figure 2: Implications of Inﬂexiblity of Installed Capital
3.1.1 Innovation
The innovation process is exactly as in the quality—ladder model of Grossman and Helpman
(1991). Competitive entrepreneurs in each sector allocate labor eﬀort to innovation, and ﬁnance
this by selling equity shares to households. The probability of success in instant t is δHi(t), where
δ is a parameter, and Hi represents the labor hours allocated to innovation in sector i.A te a c h
date, entrepreneurs decide whether or not to allocate labor hours to innovation, and if they do
so, how much. The aggregate labor hours allocated to innovation is given by H(t)=
R 1
0 Hi(t)dt.
New ideas and innovations dominate old ones by a factor eγ. Successful entrepreneurs must
choose whether or not to implement their innovation immediately or delay implementation until
al a t e rd a t e . 25 Once they implement, the associated knowledge becomes publicly available, and
25We adopt a broad interpretation of innovation. Recently, Comin (2002) has estimated that the contribution of
11can be built upon by rivals. However, prior to implementation, the knowledge is privately held
by the entrepreneur.26 We let the indicator function Zi(t) take on the value 1 if there exists a
successful innovation in sector i which has not yet been implemented, and 0 otherwise. The set
of instants in which new ideas are implemented in sector i is denoted by Ωi.W el e tV I
i (t) denote
t h ee x p e c t e dp r e s e n tv a l u eo fp r o ﬁts from implementing a success at time t,a n dV D
i (t) denote
that of delaying implementation from time t until the most proﬁtable future date.
3.1.2 The Market for Fixed Capital
Entrepreneurs cannot simply “sell” their idea to capital owners, but must be involved in its
implementation. We assume entrepreneurs have insuﬃcient wealth to purchase the capital stock
needed to implement, and hence must eﬀectively rent it from capital owners (e.g. banks). In the
basic version of our model, we assume that the capitalist is able to oﬀer a rental price sequence per
unit of utilized capital into the indeﬁnite future {qi(τ)}∞
τ=t. We assume that the price sequence
represents a binding commitment that cannot be adjusted ex post. Under such a price sequence







qi (τ)λi(τ)Ki(τ) − ˙ Ki(τ)
i
dτ. (6)
Since capital is sector speciﬁc, the price sequence that is oﬀered in equilibrium is determined
by the possibility of a “replacement capitalist” building an alternative capital stock to displace
that of the current capital owner within the sector (see Figure 1). If the threat of entry were
always suﬃcient to induce competitive pricing,27 there would be no need for long—term price
commitments. In the cyclical equilibrium that we study, however, the threat of entry is suﬃ-
cient to lead to competitive pricing only during expansions. During contractions, replacement
capitalists have reduced incentives for entry which, in the absence of price commitments, would
allow incumbent capitalists to price gouge. Anticipating this, entrepreneurs demand binding price
commitments from capital suppliers before entering the recession. A capital owner unwilling to
provide such a commitment will be passed over in favor of a replacement capitalist who is.
It may seem unusual to assume that capital owners charge a rental price per unit of utilized
rather than installed capital. This assumption simpliﬁes the exposition considerably, by allowing
measured R&D to productivity growth in the US is less that 1/2 of 1%. As he notes, a larger contribution is likely
to come from unpatented managerial and organizational innovations.
26Even for the case of intellectual property, Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) show that ﬁrms make extensive use
of secrecy in protecting productivity improvements. Secrecy likely plays a more prominent role for entrepreneurial
innovations, which are the key here.
27In order to maintain competition in capital supply it will be assumed that, in the event of a competing capital
stock being built, ties in tended prices are always broken in favour of the entrant. Due to storage costs, entry of
replacement capital will imply scrapping of the pre-existing stock.
12us to decentralize the decisions of entrepreneurs and capital owners. In Section 9, we show that the
equilibrium price sequences can be replicated as part of an endogenous, incomplete contracting
equilibrium, in which contracts optimally specify the rental price of installed capital and the
utilization rate.
3.2 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
Given initial state variables28 {Ai(0),Z i(0),K i (0)}1




ˆ pt(t), b qi(t), ˆ λi(t), ˆ xi(t). b Ki(t), b Li(t), b Hi(t), b Ai(t), b Zi(t), b V I
i (t), b V D




f o re a c hi n t e r m e d i a t es e c t o ri, and
(2) economy wide sequences
n
b Y (t), b R(t), b w(t), b C (t), b S (t)
o
t∈[0,∞)
which satisfy the following conditions:
• Households allocate consumption over time to maximize equation (1) subject to the budget
constraint, equation (2). The ﬁrst—order conditions of the household’s optimization require that
b C(t)σ = b C(τ)σe
b R(t)−b R(τ)−ρ(t−τ) ∀ t,τ, (7)
and that the transversality condition holds
lim
τ→∞e−b R(τ)b S(τ)=0 (8)
• Final goods producers choose intermediates, xi, to minimize costs given prices pi, subject to






• Intermediate goods producers choose combinations of utilized capital Ku
i (t), and labour hours,
























• The unit elasticity of demand for intermediates implies that limit pricing at the unit cost of the








28Without loss of generality, we assume no stored output at time 0.
13The resulting instantaneous proﬁte a r n e di ne a c hs e c t o ri sg i v e nb y
π(t)=( 1− e−(1−α)γ)Y (t). (12)
• Capital owners buy ﬁnal output in the form of new capital if and only if Ku
i (t)=Ki(t) and
˙ Ku
i (t) > 0 and rent it to intermediate producers.
• Labor markets clear: Z 1
0
b Li(t)di + b H(t)=1 (13)
• Arbitrage trading in ﬁnancial markets implies that, for all assets that are held in strictly positive
amounts by households, the rate of return between time t and time s must equal
b R(s)−b R(t)
s−t .
• Free entry into innovation – entrepreneurs select the sector in which they innovate so as to
maximize the expected present value of the innovation, and
δmax[b V D
i (t), b V I
i (t)] ≤ b w(t), b Hi(t) ≥ 0 with at least one equality. (14)
• At instants where there is implementation, entrepreneurs with innovations must prefer to im-
plement rather than delay until a later date
b V I
i (t) ≥ b V D
i (t) ∀ t ∈ b Ωi. (15)
• At instants where there is no implementation, either there must be no innovations available to
implement, or entrepreneurs with innovations must prefer to delay rather than implement:
Either b Zi(t)=0 , (16)
or if b Zi(t)=1 , b V I
i (t) ≤ b V D
i (t) ∀ t/ ∈ b Ωi.
• Free entry into ﬁnal output production.
• Free entry of replacement capital: b V K
i (t) ≤ b Ki (t), where b V K
i is the value of capital determined
under the value maximizing sequence of price commitments.
4 T h eP o s i t e dC y c l i c a lG r o w t hP a t h
In this section, we informally posit a cyclical equilibrium growth path and the behavior of agents
in the economy. We then detail the implications for investment, consumption and innovation.29
In Section 5, we formally derive the implications of this behavior over each phase of the cycle,
and Section 6 then demonstrates the consistency of the posited behavior of entrepreneurs and
capitalists in an equilibrium steady state, and derives the conditions for existence.
29There is a second equilibrium balanced growth path along which growth is constant and innovations are always
implemented immediately. We chracterize this “standard” growth path in Appendix B.
14Figures 3 and 4 depict the movement of key variables during the cycle. Cycles are indexed by
the subscript v, and feature a consistently recurring pattern through their phases. The vth cycle
features three distinct phases:
• The expansion is triggered by a productivity boom at time Tv−1 and continues through
subsequent capital accumulation, leading to continued growth in output, consumption and wages.
Over this phase interest rates fall and investment declines. Since its productivity in manufacturing
is high, no labor is allocated to innovation. As capital accumulates the returns to physical
investment decline, while the return to innovation grows as the subsequent boom approaches.
Eventually innovation and reorganization re-commence, drawing labor hours from production.
Due to the rigidities of installed capital, the marginal product of capital drops to zero.
• The contraction thus starts with a collapse in ﬁxed capital formation at time TE
v .I n t e r m e d i -
ate producers experience a reduction in aggregate demand and cut back on the labour hours they
employ in production. This labour eﬀort is optimally re-allocated to relatively labor—intensive
innovation and re—organization. Successful entrepreneurs ﬁnd it optimal to delay implementa-
tion until the boom. Due to the rigidity of installed capital, labor’s departure from production
implies that capital is not fully utilized. Through the downturn the economy continues to con-
tract through declining consumption expenditure, capital utilization falls and innovation and
reorganization continue to increase.
• The boom occurs at an endogenously determined date, Tv, when the value of implementing
stored innovations ﬁrst exceeds the value of delaying their implementation. At that point, suc-
cessful entrepreneurs implement, starting the upswing once again. The returns to production rise
above those of innovation, drawing labor back into production. Returns to capital also rise with
the new more productive technologies, so that capital accumulation recommences and the cycle
begins again.
4.1 Consumption
Since the discount factor jumps up at the boom, consumption exhibits a discontinuity during
implementation periods. The optimal evolution of consumption from the beginning of one cycle




= R0(Tv) − R0(Tv−1) − ρ(Tv − Tv−1). (17)
where the 0 subscript is used to denote values of variables the instant after the implementation
boom.30 Note that a suﬃcient condition for the boundedness of the consumer’s optimization

















Figure 3: Evolution of Aggregates over the Cycle
problem is that ln
C0(Tv)






< ρ ∀ v. (18)
The discount factor used to discount from some time t during the cycle to the beginning of
the next cycle is given by




4.2 Innovation and Implementation
Let Pi(s) denote the probability that, since time Tv−1, no entrepreneurial success has been made
in sector i by time s. It follows that the probability of there being no entrepreneurial success by
time Tv conditional on there having been none by time t,i sg i v e nb yPi(Tv)/Pi(t). Hence, the
value of an incumbent ﬁrm in a sector where no entrepreneurial success has occurred by time t


























Figure 4: Evolution of Prices over the Cycle
The ﬁrst term here represents the discounted proﬁt stream that accrues to the entrepreneur with
certainty during the current cycle, and the second term is the expected discounted value of being
an incumbent thereafter.
Lemma 1 In a cyclical equilibrium, successful entrepreneurs can credibly signal a success imme-
diately and all entrepreneurship in their sector will stop until the next round of implementation.
Unsuccessful entrepreneurs have no incentive to falsely announce success. As a result, an entre-
preneur’s signal is credible, and other entrepreneurs will exert their eﬀorts in sectors where they
have a better chance of becoming the dominant entrepreneur.
In the cyclical equilibrium, entrepreneurs’ conjectures ensure no more entrepreneurship in
a sector once a signal of success has been received, until after the next implementation. The










In the cyclical equilibrium, such delay is optimal; i.e. V D
i (t) >VI
i (t) throughout the contraction.
Successful entrepreneurs are happier to forego immediate proﬁts and delay implementation until
the boom in order to ensure a longer reign of incumbency. Since no implementation occurs during
17the cycle, by delaying, the entrepreneur is assured of incumbency until at least Tv+1. Incumbency
beyond that time depends on the probability that there has not been another entrepreneurial
success in that sector up until then.31
The symmetry of sectors implies that entrepreneurial eﬀort is allocated evenly over all sectors
that have not yet experienced a success within the cycle. This clearly depends on some sectors
not having already received an entrepreneurial innovation, an equilibrium condition that will be











where e Hi(τ) denotes the quantity of labor that would be allocated to entrepreneurship if no
entrepreneurial success had occurred prior to time τ in sector i. The amount of entrepreneurship
varies over the cycle, but at the beginning of each cycle all industries are symmetric with respect
to this probability: Pi(Tv)=P(Tv) ∀i.
5 The Three Phases of the Cycle
5.1 The (Neoclassical) Expansion
During the expansion the economy’s dynamics are essentially identical to those of the Ramsey
model with no technological change:32











v−1K(t)α − C(t). (24)








where r(t)= ˙ R(t). As long as utilized capital is anticipated to grow, capitalists never acquire
more capital than is needed for production, so that Ku
i (t)=Ki(t). The existence of potential
31A signal of further entrepreneurial success submitted by an incumbent is not credible in equilibrium because
incumbents have incentive to lie to protect their proﬁt stream. No such incentive exists for entrants since, without
a success, proﬁts are zero. Note also that the reason for delay here diﬀers from Shleifer (1986) where the length of
incumbency is exogenously given.
32Note that, unlike the Ramsey model, the rate of return on savings is not equal to the marginal product of
capital, but rather is a fraction e
−(1−α)γ of it. This reﬂects the entrepreneurial share of this marginal product
accruing as a monopoly rent.
18replacement capitalists implies that capital owners cannot earn excess returns on marginal units,
so that qi (t)=q(t)=r(t). It follows that all ﬁrms choose the same capital—labour ratio












denotes the state of technology in use during the vth cycle. With all labour allocated to produc-




With technology ﬁxed during this phase, the price of capital declines and the wage rises in
proportion to the capital stock. Since the next implementation boom is some time away, the
present value of engaging in entrepreneurship initially falls below the wage, δV D(t) <w (t),
so that no labor is allocated to innovation or re—organization. During the expansion, δV D(t),
grows at the rate of interest and eventually equals w(t).33 At this point, if all workers were to
remain in production, returns to entrepreneurship would strictly dominate those in production.
As a result, labor hours are re—allocated from production and into innovation, which triggers the
contractionary phase.
5.2 The (Keynesian) Contraction
As labour is withdrawn from production, the ratio of utilized capital to labour hours and tech-
nology are both ﬁxed. Consequently, the marginal product of capital remains constant. A further
implication is that, through the contraction, the wage remains constant:
Lemma 2 : T h ew a g ef o rt ∈ [TE
v ,T v] is constant and determined by the level of technology and
the capital—labor ratio chosen at the last peak, K(TE
v ):34




Since there is free entry into entrepreneurship, w(t)=δV D(t), and so the value of entre-
preneurship, δV D(t), is also constant. Since the time until implementation for a successful en-
trepreneur is falling and there is no stream of proﬁts (because implementation is delayed), the
33We derive conditions which ensure this is the case subsequently.
34Since the labour force is normalized to unity, the capital—labour ratio equals the capital stock during the
expansion.
19instantaneous interest rate necessarily equals zero. If it were not, entrepreneurial activity would








Note that this zero interest rate is consistent with the fact there is now excess (under—utilized)
capital in the economy. Since marginal returns to new capital in this phase are zero, physical
investment ceases and the only investment is that in innovation, undertaken by entrepreneurs.
Lemma 3 : At TE
v , investment in physical capital falls discretely to zero and entrepreneurship
jumps discretely to H0(TE
v ) > 0.
A switch like this across types of investment is also a feature of the models of Matsuyama (1999,
2001) and Walde (2002). However, here factor intensity diﬀerences between innovation and pro-
d u c t i o nl e a dt oap r o t r a c t e dr e c e s s i o n .
Although investment falls discretely at t = TE
v , consumption is constant across the transition
between phases because the discount factor does not change discretely. With the ﬁxed ratio
of utilized capital to labor hours, the decline in output due to the fall in investment demand
is proportional to the fraction of labor hours withdrawn from production. It follows that the
fraction of labor hours allocated to entrepreneurship at the start of the downturn, Hv = H0(TE
v ),




















Although consumption cannot fall discretely at TE
v , the zero interest rate implies that consump-








as resources ﬂow out of production and into entrepreneurship.
Since Y (t)=C (t), the growth rate in the hours allocated to production is also given by (31)
and so aggregate entrepreneurship at time t is given by




Note that due to the ﬁxed capital-labor ratio, as labor leaves current production, capital utilization
falls in the same proportion. It follows that the capital utilization rate speciﬁed in (10) is given
by
λ(t)=( 1− Hv)e− ρ
σ(τ−TE
v ). (33)
35Although r =0 , strict preference for zero storage results from the arbitrarily small storage costs.
205.2.1 The Rental Price of Capital during Downturns
In the absence of a capital price commitment, intermediate producers would be vulnerable to
an increasing rental price through the downturn. This is because replacement capital owners are
better oﬀ waiting until the boom, when capital will be relatively cheap, rather than displacing the
incumbent immediately and earning the rental rate for a relatively short time. To see this formally,
observe that, in order to forestall entry by a competing capitalist, the incumbent capitalist is
constrained to oﬀer a price sequence, q(τ) and induced capital utilization, λ(τ) which satisﬁes
V K (K(t),t) ≤ K(t), (34)
where V K (K(t),τ) denotes the value of the installed capital at time τ. During the downturn















However competition from potential replacement capitalists at the beginning of the next cycle





v ). Dividing by K(TE
v ) and re—arranging, using (33), yields







v )dτ ≤ 1 − e−β(Tv). (36)
The right hand side of this expression is constant throughout the downturn, but the left—hand side
decreases through the downturn for a given sequence {q(τ)}
Tv
τ=t. It follows that, in the absence
of a binding price commitment, the capitalist could raise q(τ) above what had previously been
oﬀered and still satisfy (36). Anticipating the potential for such price gouging, entrepreneurs
demand the commitment before TE
v , while the cost of replacement capital is still low. Any such
price commitment must satisfy (36) which will bind at t = TE
v :
Lemma 4 Any price commitment qc
i(τ) signed at some date t ∈ [Tv−1,TE







v )dτ =1− e−β(Tv) (37)
There are a number of price sequences qc(τ) that could satisfy this condition, however the
average level of prices satisfying it through t ∈ [Tv−1,TE


























v = Tv − TE
v . The capitalist could never be made better oﬀ by committing to a price
sequence that varies through the recession instead of the constant price qv.36
Given wv and qv, entrepreneurs choose a cost—minimizing ratio of utilized capital to labor
hours. Since this is constant through downturn, it follows that the installed capital—labour ratio










qv . Given the constant wage from (28) it then directly
follows that:
Proposition 2 Cost minimization ensures that capital is installed only up to the point at which





v )α−1 = q, (40)




denotes the average level of technology in use in the vth
cycle.
Equating (39) and (40), substituting for 1 − Hv using (30), it follows that the capital—
















1 − e−(1−α)Γv . (41)






is also the capital stock at the beginning of the next boom
5.2.2 Does GDP really contract?
During this phase, Y (t) is not equal to real GDP because it does not include the contribution of
entrepreneurial inputs. This can easily be corrected as follows:
GDP = Y (t)+¯ wvH(t)
= π(t)+¯ wv (1 − H (t)) + ¯ qvKu (t)+ ¯ wvH (t)






36Under any variable price sequence that averages to qv, entrepreneurs would have incentive to increase demand
for capital when q (τ) < qv, store that output not needed to meet the demand of the ﬁnal goods sector, and
correspondingly reduce production, and demand over those τ such that q(τ) > qv. By substituting capital demand
to times when the price is low, returns to the capital owner would fall.
22Clearly, GDP contracts through this phase, because both proﬁts and payments to capital owners,
λ(t)¯ qv, fall. Thus, the recession is not a result of mis—measurement, or because innovative inputs
are not being counted. The reason is that, due to imperfect competition, wages are less than the
marginal product of labour. As labour hours are transferred to innovative activities, the marginal
cost in terms of output exceeds the marginal beneﬁt of innovation. In eﬀect, the transfer of labour
imposes a negative externality on intermediate producers and capital owners.
5.3 The (Schumpeterian) Boom






Productivity growth at the boom is given by Γv =( 1−P(Tv))γ, where P(Tv) is deﬁned by (22).
Substituting in the allocation of labor to entrepreneurship through the downturn given by (32)
and letting
∆E
v = Tv − TE
v , (43)
yields the following implication:
Proposition 3 : In an equilibrium where there is positive entrepreneurship only over the interval
(TE
v ,T v], the growth in productivity during the subsequent boom is given by
Γv = δγ∆E









Over the boom, the asset market must simultaneously ensure that entrepreneurs holding
innovations are willing to implement immediately (and no earlier) and that, for households,
holding equity in ﬁrms (weakly) dominates holding claims on alternative assets (particularly
stored intermediates). The following Proposition demonstrates that these conditions imply that
during the boom the discount factor must equal productivity growth:37
Proposition 4 Asset market clearing at the boom requires that
β(Tv)=( 1− α)Γv. (45)
37Shleifer’s (1986) model featured multiple expectations—driven steady state cycles. Such multiplicity cannot
occur here because, unlike Shleifer, the possibility of storage that we allow forces a tight relationship between Γv
and ∆
E
v as depicted in Proposition 3. Since Γv,∆
E
v pairs must satisfy this restriction as well, in general, multiple
solutions cannot be found.
23During the boom, β(Tv) equals the growth in ﬁrm values and wages grow in proportion to
productivity. Since, just before the boom, δV I(Tv)=w(Tv), a corollary is that
δV I




The growth in output at the boom exceeds the growth in productivity for two reasons: ﬁrst
labor is re—allocated back into production, and second the previously under—utilized capital is now




of their peak levels, output growth through the boom is given by
∆lnY (Tv)=( 1 − α)Γv +( 1− α)∆lnL + α∆lnKu




v − ln(1 − Hv) (47)
It follows directly from Proposition 4 that growth in output exceeds the discount factor across
the boom. Since proﬁts are proportional to output, this explains why ﬁrms are willing to delay
implementation during the downturn.
The boom in output can be decomposed into a boom in consumption and investment. From





Notice that whether the growth in consumption exceeds the growth in productivity at the boom,
depends on the value of σ. In particular, if σ < 1, consumption growth must exceed aggregate
productivity growth. Finally, since in the instant prior to the boom C (Tv)=Y (Tv), it follows
that the investment rate at the boom jumps to
˙ K0(Tv)
Y0(Tv)






6 Optimal Behavior During the Cycle
Optimal entrepreneurial behavior imposes the following requirements on our hypothesized equi-
librium cycle:
• Successful entrepreneurs at time t = Tv must prefer to implement immediately, rather than




24• Entrepreneurs who successfully innovate during the downturn must prefer to wait until the
beginning of the next cycle rather than implement earlier and sell at the limit price:
V I(t) <VD(t) ∀ t ∈ (TE
v ,T v) (E2)
• No entrepreneur wants to innovate during the slowdown of the cycle. Since in this phase of the
cycle δV D(t) <w (t), this condition requires that
δV I(t) <w (t) ∀ t ∈ (0,TE
v ) (E3)
• Finally, in constructing the equilibrium above, we have implicitly imposed the requirement that
the downturn is not long enough that all sectors innovate:
P(Tv) > 0. (E4)
Taken together conditions (E1) through (E4) are restrictions on entrepreneurial behavior that
must be satisﬁed for the cyclical growth path we have posited to be an equilibrium.
Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of the value functions and wages through the cycle. Following
the boom at Tv−1, δV I remains above δV D for a while so that if there were any new innovations,
immediate implementation would dominate delay. However, over this phase, the relative value of
labor in production, w, exceeds returns to entrepreneurship, so that no entrepreneurial successes
are available to implement. Throughout this expansionary phase, investment occurs so that the
wage continues to rise. At the same time, V D also rises as the next implementation period draws
closer. Throughout this phase V I declines as the duration of guaranteed positive proﬁts falls.
The end of the expansion corresponds to the commencement of entrepreneurship – when
the increasing value of delayed implementation eventually meets the opportunity cost of labor in
production, w = δV D. Since, during the contraction, interest rates are zero, V D remains constant
s ot h a tt h ew a g em u s ta l s ob ec o n s t a n t .I n i t i a l l y ,V I continues to fall, but eventually rises again as
the probability of remaining the incumbent at the boom, given that an entrepreneurial success has
not arrived in one’s sector, increases. This increase in V I is the force that will eventually trigger
the next boom that ends the recession. It occurs when V I just exceeds V D and entrepreneurs
implement stored entrepreneurial successes, leading to an increase in productivity, a jump in
demand, movement of labor back to production, and full capacity utilization.
7 The Stationary Cyclical Growth Path
To allow a stationary representation, we normalize all aggregates by dividing by ¯ Av−1 and denote










economy during the expansion are analogous to those in the Ramsey model without technological
change. Let cv = c(TE
v ) and kv = k(TE
v ) denote the normalized values of consumption and capital
at the peak of the vth expansion. Given initial values c0(Tv−1) and k0(Tv−1), a n da ne x p a n s i o n
length ∆X
v , it is possible to summarize the expansion as follows:
cv = f(c0(Tv−1),k 0(Tv−1),∆X
v ) (50)
kv = g(c0(Tv−1),k 0(Tv−1),∆X
v ), (51)
where f(·) and g(·) are well—deﬁned functions. Since capital accumulation stops in the recession,
and A rises by eΓv−1, it follows that
k0(Tv−1)=e−Γv−1kv−1. (52)
From (31), consumption declines by a factor e−
ρ
σ∆E
v−1 i nt h er e c e s s i o n .W h e nc o m b i n e dw i t hi t s






















Imposing stationarity, so that Γv = Γ,k v = k, cv = c, ∆E
v = ∆E and ∆X
v = ∆X for all v, on
the system described by (44), (41), (54), (55) and (46) yields a system of ﬁve equations in the
ﬁve unknowns that summarize the stationary cycle:
26Proposition 5 The stationary cycle (Γ,k,c,∆E,∆X) satisﬁes the following system of equations:

































0(c,k,Γ,∆E,∆X)=( 1 − α)e−(1−α)γe−αΓkα (60)
where vI
0 = V I
0 (Tv)/ ¯ Av.
The stationary cycle can be understood heuristically from the phase diagram in Figure 6.






















Figure 6: Phase Diagram
The economy does not evolve along the standard stable trajectory of the Ramsey model
terminating at the steady state, S. Instead, the evolution of the cycling economy during the
expansion is depicted by the path between A and B in the ﬁgure. Capital is accumulated starting
at the point k0 corresponding to point A in the diagram, according to (23) and (24). The point
27k0 denotes the inherited capital stock at the boom. Accumulation ends at k
¡
TE¢
,a tw h i c hp o i n t
investment stops until the next cycle. Note that if allowed to continue along such a path the
economy would eventually violate transversality, but capital accumulation stops and consumption
declines so that the economy evolves from B to C through the downturn. During this phase, the
dynamics of the economy are no longer dictated by the Ramsey phase diagram. When this
phase ends, implementation of stored productivity improvements occurs at the next boom, and
¯ A increases, so that k fall discretely. If σ < 1, consumption grows by more than productivity at
the boom, so that c rises discretely. The boom is therefore depicted by the dotted arrow back
to point A. At this point, investment in the expansionary phase recommences for the next cycle.
The connection between the two phases of the cycle arises due to the allocation of resources to
entrepreneurship. This allocation of resources will be reﬂected in the size of the increment to ¯ A,
Γ.
7.1 A Numerical Example
We numerically solve the model for various combinations of parameters and check the existence
conditions (E1)—(E4). We choose parameters to fall within reasonable bounds of known values,
and present a baseline case given in Table 1:







The parameters α and γ were chosen so as to obtain a labor share of 0.7, a capital share of 0.2 and
ap r o ﬁt share of 0.1. These values correspond approximately to those estimated by Atkeson and
Kehoe (2002). The value of γ corresponds to a markup rate of around 15%. The intertemporal
elasticity of substitution 1
σ is slightly high, but in Appendix C, we provide simulation results for
various values below, including σ =1 .G i v e nσ =0 .79, we calibrated δ and ρ so as to match a
long—run annual growth rate of 2.2% and an average risk—free real interest rate of 3.8%, values
which correspond to annual data for the post—war US. The baseline case above yields a cycle
length of a little less than 4 years, Hv = .2044, and kv =7 .668. In this, and all simulations we
have computed, steady state values are unique.38
38Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) explicitly establish uniqueness of the stationary cycle when capital accumulation
is not allowed. It seems likely that the introduction of capital would not lead to an additional stationary cycle
288 Implications
8.1 Tobin’s Q and Investment
Tobin’s Q is typically measured as the ratio of the value of ﬁrms to the book value of their capital





where Π(t) denotes the stock market value of the intangible capital tied up in ﬁrms, and recall
that V K(t) is the market value of their physical capital. Figure 7 illustrates the evolution of
Tobin’s Q, its tangible component (V K/K) and aggregate investment over the cycle.
During an expansion V K(t)=K(t) and, the value of intangible capital is equal to the value






Since V I(t) declines and K(t) grows during the expansion, Q(t) must decline.










v ) <K (TE
v ). (63)
Also some sectors experience innovations, so there exist terminal ﬁrms who are certain to be
made obsolete at the next round of innovation. At any point in time the measure of sectors in
which no innovation has occurred is P(t), therefore the total value of ﬁrms on the stockmarket is
given by
Π(t)=( 1− P(t))[V T(t)+V D(t)] + P(t)V I(t), (64)
where V T(t) denotes the value of “terminal” ﬁrms who are certain to be made obsolete during
t h en e x tw a v eo fi m p l e m e n t a t i o n .T h ev a l u eo ft h e s eﬁrms can be written as




Substituting into (64) yields








here, but we have not been able to establish this analytically.
29Through the downturn, the value of intangible capital initially falls and then rises again as
the economy approaches the next boom.39 Immediately prior to the boom P(t)=P(Tv),s ot h a t








∀ t ∈ [TE
v ,T v). (67)
During the contraction, then, Q(t) initially declines as K(t) remains unchanged and the decline in
V k(t) dominates. However, eventually the growth in the value of intangible capital, ˆ Π(t), starts
to dominate as we approach the boom, so that Q(t) rises in anticipation. At the boom, since
the book value of capital remains unchanged, but the market value of physical capital grows by








Figure 7: Tobin’s Q and Investment
The qualitative behavior of Tobin’s Q in our model thus accords quite well with its aggregate
c o u n t e r p a r ti nU Sd a t a .A si l l u s t r a t e di nF i g u r e1 ,T o b i n ’ sQt e n d st or e a c hap e a kp r i o rt ot h e
peak of expansions and then reaches a minimum before the end of the NBER—dated recessions.
The most rapid periods of growth in Tobin’s Q therefore start to occur before the end of recessions
and continue through the subsequent boom just as they do in our stationary cycle.
8.2 Additional Results
Although, our focus is on investment and the stockmarket, our model also endogenously generates
behavior of a number of key variables that are qualitatively consistent with the facts:
39This cyclical anticipation of future proﬁts implicit in aggregate stock prices accords well with the ﬁndings of
Hall (2001).
30• Output growth is characterized by a three—stage process – Output grows rapidly at the boom,
at a lower rate during the subsequent expansion before turning negative. This is characterization
is consistent with time—series evidence provided by non—linear econometric models of output (e.g.
Dahl and Gonzalez—Rivera, 2003).
• Labour productivity is strongly pro—cyclical – During expansions, all labor is used in production
and capital is fully utilized, so that labor productivity rises though capital accumulation. In
contractions, labor is reallocated to innovative activities, capital utilization falls, and output
declines. If utilized capital and labor were correctly measured, labour productivity should remain
constant through the recession. If the re—allocation of labor were not fully measured, then it would
appear that labor is being hoarded (see Fay and Medoﬀ 1985),40 and measured labour productivity
would fall. This is consistent with the evidence of Fernald and Basu (1999), for example. Even
if labour re—allocations were correctly accounted for, measured productivity would still fall since
capital utilization is typically not well measured.
• Wages rise less than output during booms and expansions, and do not fall during contractions
– as a result, wages are inherently less procyclical than output, which again is consistent with
most evidence for the US. Since there are no aggregate employment ﬂuctuations in our model,
one must be careful in interpreting this implication. We discuss extensions of the model that
would allow for unemployment in our conclusion.
• Labor and capital inputs into consumption and investment sectors are both pro—cyclical – the
canonical RBC model implies that inputs into consumption are countercyclical (e.g. Christiano
and Fisher 1995). The allocation of labor to consumption good production can be inferred from
equation (48). As long as σ < 1 consumption growth exceeds productivity growth so that the
allocation of labor and capital to consumption must rise at the boom. The reason labor in both
consumption and investment good production can rise is because of the endogenous shutting down
of entrepreneurship at the boom. This mechanism is similar to that generated by introducing
“homework” in Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991).
• The term spread is small during expansions and high midway through contractions – we deﬁne
the term spread as the diﬀerence between a 30 year annualized interest rate and a 3 month interest
rate. The cycle analyzed here exhibits a low value of the term spread through the expansion, and
a high value in the recession. The highest value occurs at the start of the recession then, towards
the end of the recession it tracks down as the three month rate starts to include the increased
40Entrepreneurship is, at best, likely to be only partially measured in the data, since much of it involves activities
that will raise long-term ﬁrm proﬁts but have little directly recorded output value contemporaneously.
31discount over the boom. Similarly, at the start of the expansion the term spread is at its lowest
point, thus again providing a leading indication of the imminent contraction. Estrella and Mishkin
(1996) argue that the term spread is a superior predictor over other leading indicators at leads
f r o m2t o4q u a r t e r s .
9 Endogenous Incomplete Contracting
In describing the cyclical equilibrium above we have assumed that capital owners can oﬀer long
term commitments with respect to the rental price per unit of utilized capital. While it simpliﬁes
the exposition, this assumption is problematic for two reasons. First, one would normally expect
the rental price to be per unit of installed capital. Secondly, during the recession such price
commitments are clearly ex—post ineﬃcient – if a more productive technology has arrived in a
sector, would it not be Pareto improving to break the commitment so as to induce early entry
by new innovators who might fully utilize the capital? In this section, we relax the assumption
of price—commitment and instead only allow agents to write long term, enforceable supply con-
tracts. We show that the behavior described above can be derived as the equilibrium outcome of
constrained—eﬃcient contracting between agents. A key incompleteness in the contracting envi-
ronment arises as a natural consequence of the process of creative destruction – capital owners
cannot write contingent contracts regarding innovations that do not exist yet.
As with exogenous price commitments, prior to the peak of each cycle, capital owners compete
by oﬀering long term contracts. However, since entrepreneurs lose their productive advantage
when displaced by superior producers, they cannot make unconditional promises to purchase
capital into the indeﬁnite future. All such contracts are thus contingent upon the entrepreneur
continuing production. Note further that the existence of an exclusive contract over the supply
of capital in sector i, places the intermediate producer in that sector in a strong market position
relative to its rivals. In order to prevent ex—post price gouging by the intermediate goods producer,
the ﬁnal goods producer will also demand a contract over the supply of intermediate goods. Such
a contract will also be written prior to the peak, when there is still eﬀective competition from
the past incumbent.41
Intermediate Supply Contracts written at t specify future output, xi (τ), and prices,
pi (τ), for all τ up to a chosen contract termination date, TX
i . Thus, such a contract is a tuple: n
{xi (τ),p i (τ)}τ∈[t,TX
i ] ,T X
i
o
. Since the productive advantage of an intermediate producer lasts
only until a superior technology is implemented in that sector, contracts allow the termination of
41Though conceptually feasible, contracts written over the supply of labor and ﬁnal output are redundant in the
equilibria we study and will not be considered further.
32agreements before TX
i if shutting down production. Otherwise, the parties can break contracts
only by mutual agreement. The value of the arrangement to ﬁnal goods producers is denoted
V Y (t).
Lemma 5 Given a sequence of input prices w(t), q(t) for t ∈ [Tv−1,T v),a ni n t e r m e d i a t e
supply contract specifying price and quantity sequences satisfying (11) and (9) for t ∈ [Tv−1,T v)







V Y (t) ≥ 0.
Capital Supply Contracts specify future binding levels of installed capital, Ki (τ), and an
eﬀective price for each unit of installed capital, λi(τ)qi (τ), for all τ up to a chosen contract termi-
nation date, TK
i . Thus a contract signed at time t is a tuple
n
{Ki (τ),λi(τ)qi (τ)}τ∈[t,T K




Contracts can be altered under the same conditions as in intermediate supply contracts. In equi-
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The existence conditions (E1) through (E4) take as given that entrepreneurs do not produce
in excess of current demand and store their output until the boom. Provided that the incumbent
entrepreneur does not terminate the capital supply contract, (45) ensures that storage across the
boom is not optimal. However, since the capital utilization and rental price sequences that we
have derived previously imply that the capital stock is being under—utilized, it is possible that
just before the boom, a rival entrepreneur who has successfully innovated may be able to “buy
out” the contract and utilize all the capital, meeting the current demand for output and storing
the remainder until the boom.
This rival would not beneﬁt from taking over the capital contract of the incumbent under
identical terms. From (45), producing output and storing it until the boom is not optimal if he
must pay a constant amount ¯ q for capital. Moreover, under (E2) implementation and sale before
the boom is not optimal. However, the rival may be willing to take over the use rights if able
to pay qv for the amount K (t) in the incumbent’s contract, utilize extra units of idle capital at
some price e q<qv, and store. Clearly any e q>0 for the excess units would be amenable to the
capitalist. The most the rival will be willing to pay per period for the current capital is qvK(TE
v ),
since e−β(Tv)q0(Tv)=qv. To buy out the contract, the rival must compensate the incumbent for
the loss of proﬁts sustained for the remainder of the cycle and must oﬀer the capitalist at least




v ) per period. It follows that















The following proposition provides a suﬃcient condition for this to hold throughout the downturn:
Proposition 6 Provided that
(1 − (1 − α)e−(1−α)γ)(1 − Hv)e−
ρ
σ∆E
v > αe−(1−α)γ (E5)
capital supply contracts specifying price and quantity sequences given by (69), (74), (33) and (40)
are undominated.
In eﬀect, condition (E5) explains how it is possible for there to be under—utilized capital
during a recession even though there exist rivals who could potentially use the capital stock more
proﬁtably. The reason is that the capital stock is “lumpy”, so that the rival cannot use part
of it while the incumbent continues to produce. For this reason, the rival must compensate the
incumbent for his proﬁt loss and this “endogenous” ﬁxed cost is too large for entry to be proﬁtable
under recessionary demand conditions. Entry does not become proﬁtable until the boom. There,
demand is high and entry costs low because the previous incumbent’s proﬁts do not need to be
compensated – they have already been destroyed by the implementation of a superior production
process. In our numerical simulations, we ﬁnd that (E5) is rarely binding, so it does not appear
to be a strong requirement for existence of the cyclical equilibrium.
In the absence of exogenous price commitment, the cyclical equilibrium is supported by limita-
tions on the contracting environment. The critical, and we think realistic, assumption is that only
future prices and quantities can be contracted ex ante. Allowing for a richer set of contracting
possibilities would overturn this result. For example, if the new incumbent entrepreneur (who ar-
rives probabilistically in the downturn) could somehow be party to the contract prior to time TE
v ,
then full utilization of the capital through the downturn could also be contracted ex ante. Such
a rich contracting environment, however, seems to require unrealistically complex and diﬃcult to
observe details to be enforceable between the parties. Thus endogenous under—utilization, which
corresponds to that observed in actual business cycles, arises here due to natural limitations in
contracting.
10 Concluding Remarks
This article shows how the qualitative relationship between investment and Tobin’s Q over the US
business cycle, arises quite naturally in a model of endogenous cyclical growth. During recessions,
34entrepreneurs delay the implementation of innovations, whose present value is reﬂected in stock
market values, until demand is high and the expected length of incumbency is maximized. Once
these innovations are implemented, the marginal product of capital jumps, inducing a prolonged
investment boom. During this period of high investment, the incentives to innovate are low and
subsequent booms are far away, so that the market value of existing ﬁrms starts to decline. This
decline anticipates the subsequent crash in investment, as resources are shifted out of current
production and into longer term activities.
In order to study these cycles in the rate of ﬁxed capital formation, we have extended the
existing literature on endogenous implementation cycles. The extension is non—trivial because the
introduction of physical capital into models like that of Shleifer (1986) undermines the existence
of cycles by allowing agents to store. In the presence of costly, endogenous innovation, however,
a unique cyclical equilibrium emerges which is robust to storage (and therefore the introduction
of capital).
Our model also generates movements in other aggregates over the cycle which are qualitatively
similar, in some respects, to those observed in US data. It should be reiterated that these results
arise in a framework where both the economy’s cyclical behavior and its growth path are fully
endogenized. Moreover, the framework we explore has remarkably few degrees of freedom; the
model is fully speciﬁed by ﬁve exogenous parameters: two summarizing household preferences,
two underlying the productivity of entrepreneurship, and one pinning down factor shares in
production.
We do not claim that the current framework is capable of providing a quantitative account
of the business cycle. However, in future work we will build on this parsimonious structure to
explore a number of key extensions:
• Aggregate uncertainty and stochastic cycle lengths – The length and other characteristics of
actual business cycles, vary from cycle to cycle and look rather diﬀerent from the deterministic
stationary equilibrium cycle described here. Introducing some degree of aggregate uncertainty
w o u l dh e l pt oa d d r e s st h i s .H o w e v e r ,i no r d e rt od e v e l o ps u c ha ne x t e n s i o nw en e e dt od e v e l o p
a deeper understanding of the local transitional dynamics of the model. It turns out that these
dynamics are not as complex as one might expect at ﬁrst blush. The reason is that the path
back to the stationary cycle (at least locally) involves the accumulation of only one factor: either
physical capital or intangible. Although a full analysis of these local dynamics is beyond the
scope of the current paper, we believe it is feasible.
• Unemployment – A natural way to introduce unemployment into the model is to allow for
unskilled labour which cannot be used in entrepreneurship and is not directly substitutable with
skilled labor in production. With putty—clay production, the marginal value of this unskilled
35labor falls to zero during the downturn and some fraction of unskilled workers would become
unemployed (just like physical capital). In a competitive labor market, this would drive unskilled
wages down to their reservation level. However, in the presence of labor market imperfections,
such as eﬃciency wages and search frictions, the dynamics of unemployment and wages interact
with the process of creative destruction in a more complex manner. In further work we explore
these dynamics more fully.
• Government policy – The framework developed here (as well as its extensions) provide a
natural framework for thinking about counter—cyclical policy. First, the question arises as to
whether removing or reducing cycles is a valid policy objective at all. Francois and Lloyd—Ellis
(2003) show that switching from the cyclical equilibrium to a corresponding acyclical one would
reduce long—run growth but increase welfare. Similar results are likely to carry over to the
stationary cycle in the current model. A second issue is that of how to implement a counter—
cyclical policy. The recession here is Keynesian in that it is associated with deﬁcient demand,
and the government could intervene, for example, by raising demand for goods and services and
taxing savings. However, such a policy would eﬀectively channel resources away from innovative
activities and may dampen growth. On the other hand the anticipation of higher demand during
a downturn might stimulate innovation, so the overall eﬀect is unclear.
36Appendix A — Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1We show: (1) that if a signal of success from a potential entrepreneur is
credible, other entrepreneurs stop innovation in that sector; (2) given (1) entrepreneurs have no
incentive to falsely claim success.
Part (1): If entrepreneur i0s signal of success is credible then all other entrepreneurs believe that i
has a productivity advantage which is eγ times better than the existing incumbent. If continuing
to innovate in that sector, another entrepreneur will, with positive probability, also develop a
productive advantage of eγ. Such an innovation yields expected proﬁt of 0, since, in developing
their improvement, they do not observe the non-implemented improvements of others, so that
both ﬁrms Bertrand compete with the same technology. Returns to attempting innovation in
another sector where there has been no signal of success, or from simply working in production,
w(t) > 0, are thus strictly higher.
Part (2): If success signals are credible, entrepreneurs know that upon success, further innovation
in their sector will cease from Part (1) by their sending of a costless signal. They are thus
indiﬀerent between falsely signalling success when it has not arrived, and sending no signal.
Thus, there exists a signalling equilibrium in which only successful entrepreneurs send a signal of
success.¥
Proof of Proposition 1: First note that in the absence of uncertainty or adjustment costs, and
as long as utilized capital is anticipated to grow, capital owners never acquire more capital than
is needed for production, so that
Ku
i (t)=Ki(t). (69)
Substituting into (6) and diﬀerentiating with respect to time yields
˙ V K
i (t)=r(t)V K
i (t) − qi (t)Ki (t)+ ˙ Ki (t)= ˙ Ki (t). (70)
Since, during this phase, V k
i (t)=Ki (t), it follows that qi (t)=q(t)=r(t) ∀ i. Combining (??)
with (9), (10) and (11), it follows that all ﬁrms choose the same capital—labour ratio. From the

















37which re-arranges to (73)
q(t)αw(t)1−α = αα(1 − α)1−αe−(1−α)γA
1−α
v−1. (73)
Thus, the input price index for t ∈ [Tv−1,TE
v ] is constant and uniquely determined by the level
of technology
Through this phase, capital is rented at a competitive price, i.e. its marginal product net of




Using this in the consumer’s Euler equation yields the equations in Proposition 1.¥
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose instead that there exists an intermediate phase in which neither
capital is accumulated nor entrepreneurship occurs. Consider the ﬁrst instant of that phase. Since
in the instant prior to that capital was being accumulated, the marginal return to investment in
physical capital must exceed ρ. Since the marginal product of capital cannot jump downwards
discretely at full capital utilization, there are only two possibilities: either (1) r(TE
v )=ρ at
t h es t a r to ft h ei n t e r m e d i a t ep h a s eo r(2) r(TE
v ) > ρ at the start of the intermediate phase.
Situation (2) can be ruled out directly since, by assumption, in the intermediate phase there is
no entrepreneurship, and so it must be the case that r>ρ and investment will occur. Situation
(1) occurs if the marginal return to capital converges continuously to r = ρ along the neoclassical
accumulation phase. But this corresponds exactly with the path of accumulation along the stable
trajectory of the Ramsey model which does not converge in ﬁnite time – this would then imply
an inﬁnite length to the capital accumulation phase.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :Long—run productivity growth is given by
Γv =( 1− P (Tv))γ (75)












Substitution into (75) and integrating gives (44).¥
Proof of Lemma 4: If V k
i (t) >K i (t) it is feasible for the the builder of a new capital stock
in sector i to commit to a price sequence qc
i (τ), which would be strictly preferred by the current
incumbent producer. A preferred sequence for the leading producer would be one in which prices
38were no higher than the contracted sequence above, but which had a strictly lower price in at
least one instant. This is feasible if V k
i (t) >K i (t). Finally, no new capitalist would enter oﬀering
a sequence V k
i (t) <K i (t), so that any equilibrium price sequence must at least satisfy (37).¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : For an entrepreneur who is holding an innovation, V I(t) is the
value of implementing immediately. During the boom, for entrepreneurs to prefer to implement




Just prior to the boom, when the probability of displacement is negligible, the value of imple-
menting immediately must equal that of delaying until the boom:
δV I(Tv)=δV D(Tv)=w(Tv). (78)
From (77), the return to entrepreneurship at the boom is the value of immediate (rather than
delayed) incumbency. It follows that free entry into entrepreneurship at the boom requires that
δV I
0 (Tv) ≤ w0 (Tv). (79)
The opportunity cost of ﬁnancing entrepreneurship is the rate of return on shares in incumbent
ﬁrms in sectors where no innovation has occurred. Just prior to the boom, this is given by the








Note that since the short—term interest rate is zero over this phase, β(t)=β(Tv), ∀ t ∈ (TE
v ,T v).






=( 1− α)Γv. (81)
Free entry into entrepreneurship ensures that β(Tv) > (1 − α)Γv cannot obtain in equilibrium.
Provided that β(t) > 0, households will never choose to store ﬁnal output from within a cycle
to the beginning of the next either because it is dominated by the long—run rate of return on
claims to future proﬁts. However, the return on stored intermediate output in sectors with no
entrepreneurial successes is strictly positive, because of the increase in its price that occurs as a
result of the boom. If innovative activities are to be ﬁnanced at time t, it cannot be the case that
households are strictly better oﬀ buying claims to stored intermediate goods rather than holding
claims to ﬁrm proﬁts. In sectors with no entrepreneurial success, incumbent ﬁrms could sell such
39claims, use them to ﬁnance greater current production and then store the good to sell at the
beginning of the next boom when the price is higher. In this case, since the cost of production is
the same whether the good is stored or not, the rate of return on claims to stored intermediates
in sector i is logpi,v+1 /pi,v =( 1− α)Γv. It follows that the long run rate of return on claims to
ﬁrm proﬁts an instant prior to the boom must satisfy
β(Tv) ≥ (1 − α)Γv. (82)
Free—entry into arbitrage ensures that β(Tv) < (1 − α)Γv cannot obtain in equilibrium. Because
there is a risk of obsolescence, this condition implies that at any time prior to the boom the
expected rate of return on claims to stored intermediates is strictly less than β(t). Combining
(81) and (82) yields the condition in the statement of the Proposition.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :Substituting for 1 − Hv in Proposition 3 using (30),w ec a ne x p r e s s

























Finally, asset market clearing over the boom (conditions (78) to (81)) imply:
δvI









0 = V I
































































































40P r o o fo fL e m m a5 :Due to the unit elasticity of ﬁnal producer demand, intermediate producing
entrepreneurs wish to set price as high as possible. Thus, contracting a lower price at any instant
is not optimal for the leader in i. Oﬀering a pc
i (t) >p i (t) in any instant would lead to a bid by
the previous incumbent that would be both feasible and preferred by the ﬁnal good producer.
Thus pc




i(t)for all t ∈ [Tv,T v+1).¥

























































v )dτ ≥ αe−(1−α)γ(Tv − t)
Since this holds with equality at t = Tv,as u ﬃcient condition is that the left hand side declines
more rapidly with t than the right hand side. That is
(1 − (1 − α)e−(1−α)γ)(1 − Hv)e−
ρ
σ(t−TE
v ) > αe−(1−α)γ (90)
This will hold for all t if holds for t = Tv. Hence, condition (50) follows.¥
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45A p p e n d i xB :T h eA c y c l i c a lG r o w t hP a t h
Proposition 7 : If
(1 − e−(1−α)γ)γ(1 − σ)




then there exists an acyclical equilibrium with a constant growth rate given by
ga =m a x
"
[δ(1 − e−(1−α)γ) − ρ(1 − α)e−(1−α)γ]γ
1 − αe−(1−α)γ − γ (1 − σ)(1− α)e−(1−α)γ,0
#
. (92)






w(t)=( 1 − α)e−(1−α)γY (t). (94)
Since q(t)=r(t) > 0, accumulating capital dominates storage, so that:
˙ K(t)=Y (t) − C(t), (95)










Since, innovation occurs in every period, free entry into entrepreneurship implies that
δV I(t)=w(t). (98)
Along the balanced growth path, all aggregates grow at the rate g. From the Euler equation it
follows that
r(t)=ρ + σg. (99)
Diﬀerenting (94) and (98) w.r.t. to time, using these to substitute for
˙ V I(t)
V I(t) in (97), and using
(99) to substitute for r(t) and (12) to sustitute for π(t),w eg e t





(1 − α)e−(1−α)γ + g. (100)
Solving for g yields (92).¥
46Appendix C: Simulation Results
Table 2: Comparative Stationary Cycles
Parameters k(TE
v ) g ∆
σδ ρα γ



















































Table 2 lists the numerical implications for growth, cycle length and terminal values of capital
stocks for various combinations of parameter values, including the baseline case. A ﬁrst thing
to note is the extreme sensitivity of cycle length, ∆ = ∆X + ∆E, to changes in parameters. In
contrast, the long—run growth rate is much less sensitive to changes in parameters than along
the acyclical growth path. Generally, increases in parameters that directly raise the impact of
entrepreneurship, δ and γ, increase the growth rate, as in the acyclical steady state. Changes
in σ and ρ also have eﬀects similar to those present in the acyclical steady state. Additionally,
however, changes in these parameters alter cycle length in ways which counterveil, and sometimes
overshadow, the direct eﬀects. For example, increasing σ, lowering inter-temporal substitutability,
generally induces lower growth in the acyclical steady state because consumers are less willing to
delay consumption to the future. A similar eﬀect is present here. However, as the table shows,
this increase also raises cycle length and amplitude, inducing more entrepreneurship and a larger
boom. The net eﬀect, as the table shows, is an increase in growth rate for this conﬁguration.
Values of σ closer to 1 do not satisfy our existence conditions given the values of other
parameters assumed in the baseline case. However, if we allow δ to rise somewhat, higher values
of σ are consistent with the cycle (see the last two rows of Table 2). Intuitively, with higher
entrepreneurial productivity, both the size of booms and the average growth rate tend to be
higher in equilibrium. As a result, households are willing to delay consumption enough even for
low elasticities of intertemporal substitution. As can be seen, the long—run growth rate in such
cases tends to be higher and the cycles shorter.
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